

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis which was just recently commemorated left us with ambivalent attitudes toward both the notion of crises and the notion of management. It taught us that crises could be good if they could result in the advancement of national aims, if they were not entirely episodes of anxiety and offensive behavior. It raised the possibility that crises could be looked at to some extent as opportunities. At the same time the word management (as in news management) acquired some unfavorable connotations, ~~and yet~~<sup>P</sup> the crisis coincided with a growing feeling that the likelihood of a major war not preceded by a crisis was growing much smaller than we considered earlier. Those of you who have been dealing with command and control problems for years know that most of the effort over the years was based upon planning for an episode that was essentially an "out of the blue" kind of aggression against the United States.

The indications of the Cuban crisis and other incidents that we've been through began to impress people more with the thought that if major war ever comes, in particular if major nuclear war comes, it will come as a result of a major crisis <sup>e</sup> proceeded by a crisis. It would not be in the nature of a building that burned to the ground before the fire alarm alerted the Fire Department. It would be proceeded by a period of urgent

searching for a solution at the highest levels of the Government - a period of internal consultations, a prolonged period of some duration, a period of soul searching at the highest levels of Government, of consultations with our allies and, probably, of communications of various forms with opponents.

Why this perception didn't arise much earlier is hard to say because there had been events before that the newspapers label crises in much the same terms as the Cuban crisis without apparently having raised this kind of attention. We can all think of Suex, Lebanon, and Kuwait. On a slightly lesser scale, such events were typically labeled crises as were the break-up of the 1960 Paris summit conference, the U-2 episode, even events like the Skybolt and certainly the Bay of Pigs.

In part, probably they didn't raise the same amount of attention and interest because in the cases, for example, of Kuwait or the Bay of Pigs, there was considerable public disagreement about the objectives that should be pursued.

There was a good deal of controversy (unlike the Cuban crisis) so that the administration at the time didn't get credit for the degree of management which it may have exhibited during the crisis. This lack of publicity inhibited the notion that crises as such were something to be studied and learned from, that management is something to be analyzed and improved. This is one legacy of the Cuban crisis to a large extent.

In connection with my duties in ISA, I'm involved at the moment in day-to-day operations concerning South Vietnam; these obviously have the character of a rather continuing crises. My

present job was preceded by some six months during which I was studying crises, past crises with hope to learning some insights that would be available in the future. As a person whose knowledge of crises had earlier been based mainly on the newspapers, I got in the course of that study a good many surprises as to what had been going on. It left me with the feeling that crises were not only an unstudied, but really an understood phenomenon which means of course that study can be expected to be rewarding. At the same time, I became most conscious in the course of this study of the obstacles to research on crises. In many cases, unanticipated obstacles, barriers that developed, pressures that arose against studying these phenomenon, walls that are constructed around the inner phenomena of crisis management had been largely hidden from me; and I think they are hidden from a good many people. And they are significant in themselves. In fact, I have organized this brief talk around some of the aspects of crises which constitute barriers and problems to crisis study. I think that to understand some of these problems, some of the peculiar aspects of crises data, is to understand some important things about crises. The aspects of crises then that I'm going to talk about are four: the crisis as failure, the crisis as surprise, the crisis as dialogue, and the crisis as summit. The fact is that the major crises that I've listed, and others that you can think of, do have the characteristics of coming, as they appear in the newspapers, as surprises. As a matter of fact, on close examination,

they usually did involve significant surprises. Now these surprises were not always what the public thought they were, or what the President may have said they were, or what various columnists may have said they were. But there seemed to be and there were very significant aspects of surprises.

This in itself becomes surprising as you begin to delve into the process of crises decision making. One thing you become aware of is the extraordinary range of information that the President has available to him - the kinds and variety of information, whose secrecy is quite well guarded, and the intensity of the intelligence process leading up to these events. Despite this effort and the sophistication of it, shocking surprises did occur. Of course the dramatic surprise of Cuba was the actual appearance of the MRBM's and IRBM's on Cuba; but in several of the other cases I mentioned, there were major surprises. Suez is one that is a little complicated to discuss because the surprise was not certainly the simple fact that the British and French did cooperate with the Israelis in the attack. But the timing of the attack, the exact nature of the attack, did in fact involve tactically, at least, quite startling surprises to Eisenhower and Dullas. This is attested to by a number of people in public accounts.

All that's necessary is that there be surprise about a significant detail, and by that I mean something that would have made a difference if you predicted it. It doesn't have to be gross outlines of the event, but it can be the timing, it can be

the precise direction, it can be the statements that accompany it, or the other events that accompany it, things which if they had been anticipated would have made a difference to the decision maker. To use the technical term from decision theory, these are events whose occurrence is associated with regret, great regret by the decision maker. This phenomena seems to be associated strongly with these major crises, although you would not necessarily put it as part of the definition. I want to come back in a moment to some of the consequences of the fact of surprise.

Next the crises as failure. The very fact of an urgent challenge requiring very urgent high-level consideration, Presidential participation, almost presupposes that somewhere the system has failed. Retrospectively, everyone may be absolved from this implication but in the meantime the very existence of the situation raises the presupposition that, as in the poem, "someone had blundered somewhere, someone had failed to foresee." There is a presumption to this effect which may or may not turn out to be true. Someone had failed to foresee the situation and planned for it earlier which is why you find yourself having to work late all night, in fact all weekend, why the President has to be flown to and from Texas. Somebody failed. Or, if the thing had been foreseen, somehow it had not been prepared for or the implications hadn't been foreseen. Steps were not taken to detour the opposing moves that had raised the crises or to counter them in advance. The crises is almost defined by the need to consider violent counter measures in the short run.

Why were not alternatives prepared or used that would have precluded the need for these violent alternatives? Now these are all questions which are going to be asked the President in his press conference. And the prospect of these questions may keep the President from having a press conference in the next week or two.

This is a rather good test of a crisis. He is going to have to face these questions in the press, in the cables from our allies, and in his official family. To say that these questions were raised is to say that the President has political stakes in this episode which we label a crises. It means that he can, however it comes out, be judged as having failed in some respect and of course he has many potential failures still ahead of him. By definition, public attention has focused upon the President's role and the administration policy in this episode, which means his decisions will have to be made in the light of the outcome but also in the light of whatever leaks out of the decision process. He will be judged on the basis of his competence in general and this has particular political significance if the crisis arises near an election. When the public will weigh what it hears and what it learns about Presidential performance in administrative performance, and act on it by their votes. Curiously, I think,

where to whom?  
Oct 1964?

I want to start by exempting myself from this invitation for merciless criticism at the end, in my new responsible position, to use a word that is commonly applied to the Government of South Vietnam (which is my main responsibility). I am feeling rather fragile as a result of the last couple of months. Merciless criticism on any subject I don't need. Friendly, supporting comments. The Cuban crises in 1962 which were just recently commemorating left us with ambivalent attitudes toward both the notion of crises and the notion of management. It taught us that crises could be good <sup>ed</sup> if they could result in the advancement of national aims, if they were not entirely episodes of anxiety and <sup>de</sup> offensive behavior. It raised the possibility that crises could be looked at to some extent as opportunities. At the same time the word management, as in "news management," acquired some unfavorable connotations, and yet the crises coincided with a growing feeling that the likelihood of major war unpreceded by a crises was growing much smaller than we considered earlier. Those of you who have been in command and control problems for years know that most of the effort over the years really I would say was based upon planning for and planning related to an episode that was thought of as essentially ~~as~~ essentially an out of the blue kind of aggression against the United States. The ~~indications~~ indications of the Cuban crises, and then looking back on other incidents that we've been through, began to impress people more with the thought that if major war ever came, in particular if major nuclear war ever came, it would come as a result of a major crises proceeded by a crises; which is to say that it would not be in the nature of a building that ~~burned~~ burned to the ground before the fire alarm alerts

the Fire Department, but that would be proceeded by a period of urgent searching for a solution at the highest levels of the Government, A period of internal consultations, a period of very deep and somewhat prolonged, that is having some duration, a period of soul searching at the highest levels of Government, consultations with our allies and probably communications of various forms with opponents. Why this perception didn't really focus interest didn't arise much earlier is a little hard to say because there have been events that the newspapers label crises in much the same terms as the Cuban crises before without apparently having raised this kind of attention. We can all think of Suez, Lebanon, the <sup>Taiwan Straits</sup> Kuwait on a slightly lesser scale such events that were typically labeled crises as the break-up of the summit conference, the U-2 episode, even things like the skybolt episode, certainly the Bay of Pigs. We can all think of these affairs. In part the probably they didn't raise the same deal of attention and interest because in the case for example of Kuwait and some of the others, Bay of pigs, there was considerable public disagreement with the objectives that seemed to be pursued. A good deal of controversy unlike typically the Cuban crises so that the administration at the time didn't get the credit for the degree of management which it may have exhibited during the crises. And didn't really raise this crises as such as something to be studied & learn from and management is something to be analysed and improved. Well, as I say this is the legacy of the Cuban crises to a large extent. In connection with my duties in ISA, I'm involved in day to day operations concerning South Vietnam which is obviously ~~a~~ character at the moment has the

of rather continuing crises, but that's only been for a couple of months. It happens to have been preceded by some six months in which I was studying crises, past crises with hope to learning some insights that would be available in the future. I got As a newspaper reader, a person whose knowledge of crises had earlier been based mainly on the newspapers, I got in the course of that study a good many had been surprises as to what was going on. It left me with the feeling that crises were not only an unstudied, but really an ununderstood phenomenon, which means of course that study can be expected to be rewarding. At the same time the thing that I became most conscious of in the course of the study were the obstacles to research on crises. In many cases unanticipated obstacles, the barriers that arose, the pressures that arose against studying these phenomena, the walls that are constructed around the inner phenomenon of crises had been hidden from me largely, and I think are hidden from a good many people. And they are significant in themselves. In fact, I think I'm going to organize this brief talk around some of the aspects of crises which are barriers ~~as~~, which constitute barriers ~~to~~ and problems to the study of them. I think that to understand some of these problems, some of the peculiar aspects of crises data is to understand some important things about arises. The aspects of crises then that I'm going to talk about are four: the crises as failure, the crises as surprise, the crises as dialogue, and the crises as summit. Now I'm going to enlarge on these in sort of a couple of rounds. The fact is that the major crises that the have come to mind — others that the ones that I've listed and the ones that you think do have the characteristics of coming, as they appear in the newspapers at least, comes surprises, and as a matter of fact in a close examination

they usually did involve significant surprises. Now these surprises were not always what the public thought they were or what the President may have said they were, what various columnists may have said they were. But they seemed to be and nevertheless ~~they~~ were very significant aspects of surprises. This in itself becomes surprising as you begin to delve into the process of crises decision making. Because of course one thing you become aware of is the extraordinary range of information that the President has available to him, The kinds of information, whose secrecy is quite well guarded, the variety of these things, and the intensity of the intelligence estimate of process leads up to events these advances and the fact that despite this effort and the sophistication of it, and I know a number of you must be involved in supporting that effort in one way or another, inspite of these, quite ~~surprise~~ shocking surprises did occur. And the fact that the crises began with, now we One, of course, the dramatic one I mentioned of Cuba, was the actual appearance of the MRBM's and IRBM's on Cuba, but in several of the other cases I mentioned as well were major surprises. Suez, this is one that is a little complicated to discuss because ~~its~~ a surprise was not certainly the simple fact that the British and French did cooperate with the Israelis in the attack but the timing of the attack, the exact nature of the attack, did in fact involve tactically at least quite startling surprise to Eisenhower and Dallas. This is attested by a number of people in public accounts of this now, supported internally. Of course all that's necessary is that there be surprise about a significant

detail, and by that I mean something that would have made a difference if you predicted it. It doesn't have to be gross outlines of the event, but ~~it~~ can be the timing, it can be the precise direction, it can be the statements that accompany it or the other events that accompany it, things which if they had been anticipated would have made a difference to the decision maker. To use the technical term for decision theory, these are events whose occurrence is associated with regret, great regret by the decision maker. And as I say, this seems to be associated strongly with these major crises, although ~~it~~ would not necessarily put <sup>you</sup> in it as part of the definition. The, ~~I want to come back for a moment to~~ some of the consequences of the fact of surprise, but I was just mentioning this aspect. These crises as failure; the very fact of a urgent challenge requiring very urgent high-level consideration, Presidential participation, almost presupposes that somewhere the system has failed. Retrospectively, everyone may be absolved from this implication but in the meantime the very existence of the situation raises ~~a open sight~~ the to question, Raises the presupposition that as in the poem that has popped into my head, someone had blundered somewhere, someone had failed to foresee. There is a presumption to this effect which may or may not turn out to be true. Someone had failed to foresee the situation and planned for it earlier which is why you seemed to find yourself having to work late all night, in fact all weekend, which is kind of a definition of a crises, and why the President has to be flown ~~to and from~~ Texas or come back from Texas or that sort of thing; why it wasn't taken care of earlier, in other words. Somebody had failed. Or the thing had <sup>not</sup> been foreseen, had somehow not been prepared for. The implications hadn't been foreseen. Steps were not taken to detour the opposing moves that had raised the crises or to counter them in

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advance. The crises is almost defined by the need to consider violent counter-measures in the short run. Why were not alternatives prepared or used that would have proclued<sup>d</sup> the need for these viole~~fnt~~nt alternatives. Now these are all questions which, to be defined "relevant" operationally, here, which are going to be asked the President in his press conference. And the prospect of those questions may keep the President from having a press conference in the next week or two in this event. Thats a rather good test. He is going to have to face those questions in the pres~~ee~~, in the cables from our allies and in his official family. To say that those questions were raised is to say that the president had political stakes, in the administration has political stakes, in this episode which we label a crises. It means that then that he can be, however it comes out, he can be judged as having failed in some respect and of course he has many potential failures still ahead of him. By definition, more or less, the public attention has focused upon the President's role and the administration policy in this episode, which means his decisions will have to be made in the light of the outcome but also in the light of whatever leaks out of the decision process. He will be judged on the bases ~~xxx~~ of his competence in general and this has political significance in particular when this thing comes near a political payoff, that is, an election--a period of payoff. When the public is in a mind to <sup>wieght</sup> what it hears and what it learns about Presidential performance in administration performance, and act on it by their votes. Now curiously, I think having looked

at it not entirely coincidentally, several of these things came during election years, in fact in ~~xxix~~ striking close connection with the ~~x~~ election. It's true both with the ~~Suez~~ which ~~happ~~ happened in the eve of Eisenhower's election and of Cuba. It's also true of several other episodes we mentioned. We had a little

1964! incident on the eve of this election and that had its consequences recently when the <sup>Bien Hoa</sup> attack on ~~Bein-wa~~ was made just prior to the election. Again I'll come back to this point, but I'll point out right now that this is a key reason why it is in fact difficult to study crises. The administration has almost nothing to gain by <sup>a</sup> ~~public knowledge of~~ close study of the decision process during the crises. If as in Cuba the outcome was regarded as good, that picture is not going to be enhanced really, they're not going to gain any additional points by the fact that ~~th~~ it was reached by a good decisions process. They get just as much credit if it were a bad decision process. If the outcome were bad, as in the Bay of Pigs, the President knew better than to try to say, how well they had readily judged and evaluated and planned before. Because he certainly wouldn't gain any points for that. All he can do is loose, really, because even Cuba, ~~too~~, Cuba the missile crisis, could be tarnished by in principle a close look at the decision process. And particularly a partial look is likely to run this risk. In other words, details can be found which taken out of context of other decisions could look bad. It doesn't help anybody. Because as I say these are events which are ~~g~~ regarded as tests of the administration in which the public is very interested and is watching very closely, unlike a number of other events, in which the press is probing for leaks very hard, which allies are concerned, . In this situation a very defensive

attitude results in and the result is that they are in fact not hostile, not really friendly to the people who know the details to the detached fix search for truth on these matters. That is too bad in a way, because going back to the first aspect, the crises as surprise, I think that a possible conclusion having looked at in a number of these as to why the surprises occur was because there is this large area of phenomenon, political high -level political behavior, not just in this US but in our opponents and our allies, that is not really very well understood. And that in turn reflects some lack of study and lack of special access. And of course this situation is prolonged both for the President and for the US and for the whole international system by this I think rather inevitable attitude toward study of the data. The third aspect, the crises as dialogue, this we've heard a great deal about during the Cuban crises. Although to look back on events which did not win the managers the acclaim, probably unfairly, something like <sup>Qomo</sup> Kuwait which could be looked at obviously have this same aspect of a conscious attempt to use the instruments that Government policy to convey a message to the opponent. Not so much to effect his capability even by the preparations we were making although they had some tendency to do that, but above all to teach him ~~somthing~~ something to convince him of something which earlier words failed to convince him of, and very to do this on an urgent bases with as high reliability as possible. This is another reason why the President is so closely involved. On one hand this involves coordinating the activities of the various <sup>instruments</sup> incidents of ~~xxx~~ Government to suppress noise or false alarm or incorrect signals and to try to give a unified picture that will be as convincing as possible. Now arises as dialogue to it which

Now a crises as dialogue has some peculiarities to it which as a communication process which have to be understood. One is that you're talking about adversary communications. You're ~~takin~~ talking in other words, not about ~~xxxxxx~~ entirely about trying to confinee for instance someone the sort of ~~situation in~~ communication process which we think of within a "team" to use the technical notion of team theory, — in which <sup>everyone</sup> one has joint objectives, common objectives, <sup>but</sup> that some difference ~~in~~ in information, some limited ability to communicate, <sup>and where</sup> the problem is to share your information. It's true that in many of the circumstances of the crises you do want to convince the opponent ~~that~~ <sup>is like</sup> of something that is true. In that respect it general <sup>but your</sup> communication, which may want to keep ~~in~~ him from learning some other things which are also true. You want to focus these expectations of his very definitely. You may want to deceive him. You may definitely want to bluff in terms of timing or intensity of your response or many aspects of it. So it's not just a simple, <sup>than</sup> ~~in other~~ <sup>It</sup> ~~pxx-words~~, process, calls for even more control ~~and~~ simply ~~sort of~~ laying open the books. It is a more complex matter. It ~~also~~, Some other complexities of this process are that it is a process that goes on over a great many channels; of course, this is what makes it possible to some extent. The President has in fact many ~~avenues with which~~, ways with which he can send ~~inx~~ information, Specifically to an opposing head of state. An opposing head of state ~~spends in this case~~, one of the stature of Russia particularly, spends a good deal of money as we do on intelligence apparatus with which to gain information on our activities and that apparatus not only constitutes channels with which he may be informed or persuaded or deceived but channels in which he virtually must be educated since

he will almost surely attach peculiar significance to the indication that he gets through that means. Thus measures, which he has spent money to pick up, of the nature of deployments, alerts, possible even signals of various kinds, <sup>are</sup> ~~the~~ aspects of our behavior which not only can be controlled so as to convey something to <sup>him</sup> us, but must be controlled. And incidentally an interesting aspect of that is that in many cases this conversation ~~is~~ over the heads of the respective publics who are not in on these particular channels. The same is ~~not~~ true of course of diplomatic channels, which can get fairly elaborate to protect them <sup>from</sup> for the next problem which is sort of the multi-audience problem. This is one which both heads of state face as a very serious one. To some extent their dialogue is conducted with a good many people listening in ~~to a large extent~~. And these people listening in, including the publics on both sides, also including the allies, are not people who necessarily at all share the same view of risks and objectives, even to the extent that the opponents may hold them in common. So you have the problem ~~that~~ of trying to ~~convince~~ convince someone of ~~some~~ thing, trying to convey something to him, and at the same time controlling the impressing that is being given to eavesdroppers <sup>in effect</sup>, so as to avoid leaking in various other ways, unconnected with sort of the main confrontation.

¶ Finally, this aspect of the crises as ~~summit~~ Conference, and I've alluded to this already, ~~but that is~~ this is a dialogue to a large extent between heads of state, conducted so far as they can ~~in many~~ <sup>with the use</sup> so devoted with respect to their publics and ~~in some cases with~~ respect to their own publics or press and <sup>because</sup> to the extent that leaks are possible to the Government Bureaucracy. Now all of these feed in to an aspect of high-level crises decision-making which is to some extent known to the public <sup>in</sup> to certain instances particularly, which

becomes more and more striking I think the more ~~examp~~ examples of this phenomenon one looks at. And that is, the peculiar extent to which this decision-making is <sup>id</sup> Presidential decision-making <sup>is</sup> very striking. This became known to the <sup>public</sup> in the connection with the Cuban crises because as I say although a certain amount, more than is usually known what the Governmental decision process did lead out in that, in part because they felt it really woulnd't ~~hur~~ hurt them particularly, <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>of</sup> In general atmosphere is kind of favorable, <sup>of</sup> and the institution which is of course more formal than usually of the so called Excom, the executive committee of the NSC, conceived or generally described as a more or less ad hoc association of close advisors to the President. That gave the impression, and I must say I had this impression when I first looked at it, that we ~~were~~ were witnessing something rather peculiar that to be associated strictly with the Cuban crises. And a matter of fact this term management, which came up later in connection with the activities with the ex-com was often thought of as something that was invented during the Cuban crises: And here had been an innovation which could now be applied elsewhere. Now a major message to convey on the nature of this decision-making is to the importance and the implications of the generality of this type of decision making which centers a great part of what is ~~in~~ usually the ~~staf~~ staff work of large staffs in the hands of a very small number of ~~exp~~ people. Its also necessary to look at what sort of ~~exp~~ people these are, <sup>which</sup> also has implications. But above all

its very striking, as I say that the role of the President in this, In effect the crises take place as the public sees them at high noon, "with the principals on both sides sort of striding down on this empty street for a confrontation, with all the possee ~~is~~ behind shutters sort of looking. Now of course they're striding forth to partly <sup>not</sup> they are not this is a strictly a military confrontation, and has this message, dialogue, aspect. That This notion that the President at this moment or for these days or hours is to an unusual degree alone is I think correct, and I must say that the ~~big~~ big surprise that I've had in the last couple of months working on South Vietnam and some other problems has been to find that the phenomenon in fact all of these phenomena and <sup>is</sup> these above all that I associated with these major crises that were reader, familiar to me as a newspaper were in fact characteristic of day to day operations and that isn't to say of noncrises operations, but what I was learning was the universality of crises as seen at the Presidential level. In fact these crises come along, many <sup>many</sup> ~~not~~ many of them, without surfacing at all, without necessary coming to full intensity, at such a rate that you can regard them as sort of normal ~~as~~ things. And yet they don't lose their character as crises. They'd be recognized as I think as crises by the public if they were described fully and the only surprise would be ~~they~~ that <sup>then</sup> they were so many of them, so many areas of the world and they were ~~happ~~ happening all at once and the fact that so many of them were hidden successfully. Well, in particular I'm saying this role of the President. Now why do we have this particular role of the Presidency. The implications of those of you who are concerned with supporting the Presidency, is

of course that this goes along a long way toward answering the question who manages the crises and who should information systems ~~be~~ for this purpose be designed to serve. The answer is the President personally must be kept very much in mind. And that is a fact which has more significant ~~in~~ than might first appear. To the extent the President ~~plays~~, is a ~~peculiar~~ peculiar sort of person in our ~~the~~ decision making system, in our policy making system. He doesn't look, the more you look at him the less he looks like the bureau heads that you're usually thinking ~~about~~ about at ~~the~~ various component parts of the problem. And this is I think something very important to understand when it comes to influencing this process of decision making, preparing for it and planning for it. To put it very simply the President is a politician. That's the ~~nature~~ nature of our system. If he isn't a politician he was coopted by some people who were politicians, to go back a little bit in memory, and ~~his~~ he is bound to be surrounded by some politicians very closely, at the highest level, and those people are going to be in the high-level process.

Now there are some other aspects of this, he's an <sup>and then</sup> amateur, he's bound to be an amateur, <sup>or</sup> <sup>behavioral</sup> he isn't going to be a professor at the kinds of decisions we're talking about. We haven't had the experience of any one who has come up through the system in any real sense in State or in Defense, in CIA who've had a really long-term background with a large series and who have <sup>for</sup> witnessed this kind of decision ~~making~~ making at high levels.

Even in his job which is <sup>an</sup> extremely expensive and very good about ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> good ~~as~~ on the job training <sup>with</sup> in very long hours, he doesn't get necessarily ~~as~~ as much experience in this kind of thinking as some other people lower down ~~the~~ in the system because of the extremely broad range of his responsibility. Now this is also true of the ~~other~~ other people who

are going to be mostly talking to him, in the course of the process. In fact it's very instructive now to ask who are these people, and if we look at Cuba and we look at the Ex-com for example, we find that it has about in its enlarged in the full state people who really met, there's about four or five people from State Department, about three people from Defense, couple, one really from CIA, a man from the ~~Treasury~~ Treasury, a man from the Justice Department, Vice President; one military man, Maxwell Taylor, is the only military representative on this body. Now these are events <sup>which</sup> on the one hand have a very high component of military activity as part of the problem and of course what makes it a crisis is that it may well lead to a great deal more. Many of the questions that have to arise are going to be military, and without saying that the problem is predominately military, the fact is that one might well say why isn't why aren't a few more uniformed men as qualified to express general judgement to the President on this matter as a man from the Justice Department or the Treasury, lets say fairly low down in state. I think this is, well I'm not going to fully answer that today, but it is ~~an~~ something to consider when we're thinking about the military aspects of supporting this process, that is within the Joint Staff, within the Services, within the Pentagon. I think one of the problems to well something to be regarded as one of the challenges here is to produce military output, output of military staffs that will be regarded as a more valuable commodity by the President lets say and will be sought for, and I think one real factor why there hasn't been more of that has been in part because of some lack of understanding of the nature of this process, this sort of thing that I'm talking about today to relate this to the interest of information system people and

especially military ones. Why is there this concentration of  
 decision making upon the President himself? And the various things  
 that I've mentioned, thinking things all of which result in a hostility  
 to students after the event, like me, also are involved in a hostility  
 to just having too many people in the room generally at the time.  
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 Namely, the implication, the presumption that there has already  
 been a failure, one that may be politically costly. That there  
 has been a surprise, which in itself is a politically damaging event  
 as the CIA's sensitivity over the years has shown, one that particularly  
 easy to focus on; why was this not foreseen, why was nothing done about  
 it? All of these create very high political sensitivity. The aspect  
 of dialogue involves diplomatic communications, and as I say these  
 are  
 various other black means which in fact tend to be concentrated very  
 exclusively for reasons for security and also for this reason for  
 of multiple audience. Things are to be said to one ally that must  
 not be heard by other allies. Things are to be said in some cases  
 to an opponent that must ~~not~~ be <sup>secret</sup> said, not necessarily because if  
 properly understood they would be so ~~dam~~ dangerous, but because  
 of the ~~per~~ probability of their being misunderstood out of  
 context. Thinking Things must ~~not~~ often not be said, must not leak  
 to the public in large degree because of the importance that they  
 not ~~leak~~ leak to the opponent's public. For example, the U-2 episode,  
 raises the interesting, ~~to me~~, point, that ~~it~~ as it came out afterwards, ~~and~~  
 of course, Khrushchev had known for years that we ~~were~~ were flying  
 U-2's, who exactly were we protecting from the information that we  
 were flying them? By our secrecy earlier, by our lies, lies being  
 after all a necessary requirement in some cases ~~for~~ for security)?  
 A point to return to in a minute. (If you're not prepared to lie

about some of these matters you have no chance of keeping them away  
 from questioners, keeping the truth away from questioners.) Now in  
 this case its fairly evident that Khrushchev was in effect being  
<sup>yet</sup>  
<sup>his</sup>  
<sup>reaction!</sup>  
<sup>"A com-</sup>  
<sup>ee, too!"</sup>  
 protected from the pressures of his own public to respond to the  
 U-2's and the fact, the exposure of the fact that he <sup>c</sup>ouldn't  
 respond during ~~these~~ this earlier period. I have a susspicion that  
 Eisenhower must have been about as anxious to ~~know~~ reveal the  
 very admirable fact, the success of the U-2, the development of the  
 U-2, he must have been under the same pressures that our administra-  
 tion has been under, this administration from time to time, <sup>it</sup> kept  
 that secret, and as I say a secret essentially from the Russian public,  
 the Russian allies, specifically the Chinese in particular. Well  
 this is not an unusual phenonenon. As a matter of fact the, an  
 aspect of the political implications of a lot of these events, is  
 that in political life ignorance is an excuse, Keeping an ally  
 even  
 or an opponent, or in some cases you might say the President, it  
 doesn't work that way but at least alleging ignorance can protect  
 him, and indeed after all in the U-2 affair Eisenhower was urged for  
 political reasons by a lot of people to maintain ignorance of the  
 U-2. Now ignorance is of course, <sup>,</sup> it has its own political costs for  
 a President. He is not suppose to be ignorant of too much and yet  
 it's a price that he may often prefer to pay, lets say the losing  
 points because he was ignorant of something, than to have appeared  
 to have known about something and failed to act in time, failed to  
 take some measure which some segment of the public feels that he  
 should have taken. For this reason, the role of the Presidency in  
 one of these processes is carefully guarded by the people around him.  
 Whatever you learn about what the President knew or what he did or

what he chose or what he thought during a crises and this is in effect a secret, is let out, is controlled very closely as a matter of fact. It may not be true in many cases. A very closely guarded secret in fact is what the President's interventions were, what the President's perception of the problem was. This for many reasons, and I don't mean political on the crassist ~~demons~~ <sup>de</sup> ~~dem~~ ~~mistic~~ sense, the prestige of the President ~~and the exact~~ <sup>and</sup> trus~~ty~~ and the attitudes toward the President, the expectations of Presidential behavior are an ~~important important~~ important component in our influence in our other nations both allies and opponents. And it's regarded as terribly important that ~~the wrong~~, that his actions not reveal the wrong expectations, the wrong things. This is one more barrier, as I said to the process of studying crises; the fact that the President himself does play a very large role in it. Because Presidential data, the memos that he asked for, the memo~~es~~ that went directly to him, accounts of conversations that ~~he~~ took place are very closely guarded, for this reason, as much as, to name some other things that are also hard to get at and very necessary to understand, <sup>as</sup> intelligence data or very close high-level diplomatic ~~communicatins~~ communications. All of these are ingredient~~e~~ of crises decision making, all of them extremely hard to get at; and lacking this ability, that means that ~~the~~, to get at this kind of data, that means that the history of past crises is to a large extent hidden history, its secret history. The decision making in those crises, whatever long detailed accounts may have come out by journalists or research students, and so forth, ~~is in fact this decision making is~~ secret to an unusual, very unusual degree. And that means that our understanding of those events, ~~are~~, as both newspaper readers and as

potential operators and as potential presidents, you might say, is almost certain to be distorted and imperfect. To draw one small point from that, the baggage of history that a president brings with him to the decisions that he faces having newly become a professional at this when he comes into the presidency, the intellectual baggage is almost certain to contain wrong notions of what happen<sup>ed</sup> in Cuba, what happened in Suez and how the whole system works. So that even the President, if you could hypnotize him and get from him what he knew, who would certainly be able to tell you more than you could read in any book, more than you could learn from any other person, any other individual, not only about the events that he participated in but he can make better guesses about the process, he will not know what happened entirely. In particular on the ~~the~~ other side for example, ~~a~~ The last minute here, my last minute here to draw some implications of this for further study possibly of this process and implementation. First just on the, I think in general more understanding on the way the decisions are made, based on what study is possible, is perhaps the most useful commodity in trying to improve this process of decision making. Better plans will be ~~written~~ written, can be it would take a lot more written, ~~not~~, you'd have to say a lot more than I've had time to say here today, that is to show how plans ~~to~~ could be improved, but I think above all they could be improved more to just give one example, the President is not regarded as the highest bureaucrat, whose objectives are laid down in some piece of ~~the~~ paper that may be described as basic national security policy or something else, in other words that he's one more transduser in the system who can be reliably predicted by the system and who commits himself like a good bureaucrat should be willing to do. The President in fact isn't

going to commit himself in advance whatever he may tell the planners. And plans written on that assumption are going to be unuseful and not used or on the other hand are going to be used to very bad effect in the event. He is among other things going to take account of some symbolic aspects of including their democratic political aspects of actions in a very complex way taking account of a very broad range of consequences. He is going to choose his advisors very closely from people whose attitudes he trusts. He will choose his advisors with very great consciousness of the costs to him of leaks of his own decision making and the likelihood and the risk of leaks. He is not, whatever, however nice the command post that is built for him, he is not going in the course of one of these crises, small or large, to come down there and make his decision in the full view of a lot of majors, or wizzkids, or anybody who just doesn't need to know. This "absurd" propensity of the President to make his decisions at his desk and his telephone reflects above all not just that he likes to feel homey in the course of this, but that he wants to control who hears who he talks to and whose decision and opinion he respects and what consideration he's taking into account. And that isn't going to change by the way, but that's of one small implication, I think, of some earlier planning that was quite unrealistic on terms of the presidential role.

Quesen